Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

State Of Utah, By And Through Its Road
Commission v. Lloyd Stanger And Edna Olson
Stanger, His Wife : Brief of Appellants

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Glen E. Fuller; Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Stanger, No. 11028 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4402

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its Road Commission,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
11028

LLOYD STANGER and EDNA
OLSON STANGER, his wife,
Defendants and ..4.ppellanta.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from Judgment and Order
Second Distriet Court, Weber County
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Presiding

Glen E. Fuller
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, utah
·----·------------------------------------Attorney for Defendants.AppeUants
l:·~ . . . ·:~- . . :._,,, .. v (: .... ;...;, U:..i:,
-

\

'

~

. 1967

George E. Bridwell
Special Assistant Attorney General
Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent

PlllN'fltD llV llA&.T &.AIClt 'tlMlll

INDEX
Page

NATURE OF THE CASE---------------------------------DISPOSITION IN LU\VER COURT ____________

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL --------------------

2

I

STATEl\,IENT OF FACTS ------------------------·········· 3
ARGUMENT -----------·········---·-············--····-···---··········
7
POINT I. T H E VARIOUS FACTORS
'VHICH CONTRIBUTE TO SEVERANCE
DAMAGES IN AN EMINENT DOMAIN
ACTION DO NOT HA VE TO BE SPECIAL
AND UNIQUE FROM THOSE SUSTAINED
BY OTHER PROPERTIES IN THE GENERAL NEIGHBORHOOD IN ORDER TO
BE CONSIDERED. ··························-·····················
7-8
POINT II. THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS INAPPLICABLE
IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES 'i\THERE
SEVERANCE DA.MAGES RESULT FROM
THE TAKING OF REAL PROPERTY, OR
ESTABLISHED EASE.MENTS OR OTHER
RIGIITS APPURTENANT TO REAL
PROPERTY. ----····---------------·········-------·············-···-···
27
CONCLUSION-------------------·-·······---·········---·-···········-·
42
l

CASES CITED

Page

Board of Education of Logan City v. Croft (1962),
13 U. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 ---------------- 12, 13, 43
Dennison v. State (New York-1966), 265 N. Y. S.
2d 671 ------·----------------------------------------·-···········---------34
Dennison v. State, 281 N. Y. S. 257 ············-----------19
Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Company
(1893), 9 U. 31, 33 P. 229 --··--------··-------------- 32, 33
DuPuy v. City of 'Vaca (Texas-1966), 396 S.W.
2d 103 -------------·-··················································
34
Fairclough v. Salt Lake County ( 1960), 10 U. 2d
417, 354 P. 2d 105 -------------------·------ 11, 21, 36, 37
Parker (Sine) v. State Road Commission (1962)
13 U. 2d 65, 368 P. 2d 585 ---------------- 11, 21, 36, 37

People v. Lundy (California-1966), 47 Cal. Rep.
694 ---··---------··················-----------·-····················--------·
31
People v. Wasserman (Calif.-1966), 50 Cal. Rep.
95 ·········--------------····························--·---------··----------35
Richardson v. Big Indian District (Nebraska1967), 151 N. W. 2d 283 -------------------------------·--.. 31
Springville Banking Company v. Burton (1960),
10 U. 2d 100, 349 P. 2d 157 ---------------- 11, 36, 40
South Carolina Highway Department v. Touchberry ( 1966), 148 S. E. 2d 747 ........................ 15
State Highway Commission v. Bloom, ( S. D. 1958)
93 N. W. 2d 572 --------------------------------------------···· 15
State Road Commission v. Fourth District Court
(1937), 94 U. 384, 78 P. 2d 502 -------------------- 32, 35
Sullivan v. Marcello (R. 1.-1966), 214 A. 2d 181.. 31
11

Page
Utah Road Commission v. Hansen (1963),
14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 ------------------------ 28, 29
\Vcber Basin District v. Gailey (1956), 5 U. 2d 385,
303 P. 2d 271 ------------------------------------------------------ 31
eber Basin v. Ward ( 1959), 10 U. 2d 29, 347
P. 2d 862 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 14

''T

AUTHORITIES CITED
18 Am. J ur., Eminent Domain, Sec. 265, p. 577 .. 15, 16

26 Am. J ur. 2d, Eminent Domain, Sec. 200, p. 882 .. 39
26 Am. J ur. 2d, Eminent Domain, Sec. 242, p. 93L 35
27 Am. J ur. 2d, Eminent Domain, Sec. 310, p. 124 .. 16
2 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec. 16.101 (5) ____ 35
2 Nichols on Eminent Domain 326, Sec. 6.4111 (1) 14
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec. 14.1, p. 473 ____ 15
United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 ---------------------------------------------------- 41
Sec. 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ------ 10, 39
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 22 -------------------- 41
Utah Highway Code, 27-12-96 -------------------------------- 28

111

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its Road Commission,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

11028

LLOYDSTANGER~dEDNA

OLSON STANGER, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a highway condemnation action brought by
the plaintiff against defendants to acquire certain lands
from the latter, wherein the issues before this Court
relate to whether or not defendants can recover damages sustained by their contiguous remaining properties
by reason of the loss of the lands taken and the construction of the project in the manner contemplated.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO,'VER COURT
The issues in this matter were reduced to a jury
determination of the amount of "severance" damages,
if any, sustained by defendant's remaining properties
by reason of the taking of .89 acre of land. The parties
had previously stipulated as to the fair market value
of the land taken.
From a jury verdict awarding defendants no
"severance" damages, defendants filed a Motion for
New Trial (R. 43), based primarily upon errors during
the trial consisting of erroneous oral instructions and
erroneous written instructions given to the jury at the
end of the trial. The Motion for New Trial was denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek reversal of the Judgment on
Special Verdict entered in this matter and of the Order
denying them a new trial, and request that the matter
be remanded to the Second Judicial District Court in
and for Weber County for a new trial. Further, because of the importance of the issues involved in this
case and many other pending cases, it is necessary that
this Court clearly rule on the material distinctions between "severance" and "consequential" damages in
eminent domain cases, and establish guidelines relating
to the application of the doctrine of sovereign immu·
nity-or to abolish it-in eminent domain cases.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 21, 1965, plaintiff served a condemnation complaint upon defendants for the purpose of
acquiring a portion of defendants' lands for highway
uses incident to the construction of the Interstate Freeway Project, which ran in a general north-south direction through Weber County in the area of the community of Marriott. Defendants owned approximately
23 acres of land on the north side of the center line of
Seventh Street, together with a residence and miscellaneous outbuildings located at the extreme southwest
corner of their holdings.
To assist the Court reference will be made to Exhibit A, which was the trial map prepared by the plaintiff for the use of the trial of this matter. Exhibit A
shows the relationship of defendants' lands to the Freeway, the location of their improvements, the area taken
for highway purposes, the prior location of Seventh
Street, and the location of the Interstate Freeway.
Before the construction of the freeway project
Seventh Street was a level road extending in an eastwest direction along the entire south side of defendants'
properties, and their residence and garage were so located that direct ingress and egress to and from Seventh
Street was had on a level grade (See Exh. 1 and 2).
The main portion of the Interstate Freeway did
not require the taking of any lands from defendants
since it passed their properties a short distance immediately west of their west property line; however, as

3

a part of the project it was determined that the originally level Seventh Street must be so altered that it
should pass over and above the Interstate Freeway. To
accomplish this a large overpass embankment was
constructed on both sides of the Interstate Freeway in
the general area of what formerly was Seventh Street.
In order to a void the removal and taking of several
homes in the area, the overpass fill veered slightly to
the south as it approached the Interstate Freeway
from its east side (thereby requiring the taking of lands
south of the original right-of-way line of Seventh Street
on the east side of the Interstate Freeway), and on
the west side of the Interstate Freeway the overpass
fill veered even farther to the south of the former
Seventh Street at the point where it crossed the Interstate Freeway so that, at that point, it was on lands
completely south of the south right-of-way line of
Seventh Street as it previously existed (Tr. 86). As
the overpass road continued westerly it veered back
to the north several hundred feet west of the Interstate
Freeway so as to again join the original Seventh
Street at grade. The "bend" in the route of the reconstructed Seventh Street thereby missed several homes
on the north side of what was formerly Seventh Street
on the west side of the Freeway; only the defendants'
home was involved on the same side of Seventh Street
on the east side of the Freeway.
By its Complaint (R. I) plaintiff sought to acquire
fee title to the .89 acre of land shown on Exhibit A.
Of the total area taken, .66 acre consisted of a strip
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of land varying between 30 and. 40 feet in width and
running most of the distance along their south boundary
line, but which was within and constituted the north
half of previously existing Seventh Street. The additional .23 acre of land was taken from within the occupied area of the Stanger holding so as to furnish an
area for the construction of a service road serving the
Stanger home and providing access at the easterly
end of the overpass constructed on Seventh Street.
Because the .66 acre in the right-of-way area of Seventh
Street had long been subjected to a public easement
for travel, the parties stipulated that the net taking
of .23 acre should be valued at $517.00. Each appraiser
(Tr. 35, 68) agreed that the land value on a per-acre
basis along the north side of Seventh Street had a fair
market value of $2,250.00 per acre and, as testified to
by defendants' appraiser, Haven J. Barlow, had a highest and best use as residential property (Tr. 24-25).
The effect of the taking required defendants to
secure access from their home and other buildings to
the re-constructed Seventh Street at a point where
the overpass leveled off on the east side of the freeway
via a service road requiring a traveling distance of
approximately 400 feet (Exh. A), as compared to their
former means of access directly onto Seventh Street
in front of their residence. This service road deadended against the Interstate Freeway fence approximately 200 feet west of their home, serving no other
homes in the area; in fact, the service road through
the west one-half of its distance from its connection to
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re-constructed Seventh Street utilized the north half of
what formerly was Seventh Street.
In addition, directly in front of their home an
earthen-type embankment was constructed at a height
of 17 feet above the original level of Seventh Street
(Tr. 6), and the base, or "toe" of the embankment was
79 feet from defendants' residence (Tr. 86).
The trial of the damage issue involved started off
with an underlying basic dispute between plaintiff's
counsel and the Court, on the one side, and defendants'
counsel on the other side. The initial dispute centered
around the matter of "severance" damages and what
factors contributing to damage could be considered by
the appraisers and the jury. Further, the additional
legal issue developed as the trial progressed relating
to whether any or all of the damages sustained by defendants' remaining properties were recoverable in view
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Following the holding of the trial judge and the
position taken by the plaintiff, the plaintiff's appraiser
testified that the remaining properties of the defendants
suffered no "severance" damages (Tr. 68), while the
appraiser for the defendants testified that their remain·
ing properties had suffered "severance" damages in
the amount of $5,806.00 (Tr. 38). Plaintiff took the
position that "severance" damages had to be special,
peculiar and unique to the properties of the defendants
as compared with damages which others in the general
neighborhood whose properties had not been taken
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might suffer (Tr. 70-71) ; in fact, plaintiff's counsel
in his opening statement based his case on the premise
that the State would show that defendants' damages
were not in fact peculiar to their properties (Tr. 66).
This same position, plus the additional claim of sovereign immunity, was advanced by plaintiff in its Motion
For Directed Verdict (Tr. 65-66). Although the Court
reserved ruling on the Motion For Directed Verdict,
throughout the trial the lower Court adopted the identical position of the plaintiff as to its interpretation
of what constituted "severance" damages and its position relating to the State's immunity from liability in
this case under the sovereign immunity doctrine.
Defendants contended that "severance" damages
need not be special, peculiar or unique to their properties
as distinguished from similar damage sustained by
others in the neighborhood who might not be in court,
and further claimed that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was totally inapplicable in this proceeding.
Facing an uphill battle throughout the trial on the
legal principles involved, defendants suffe~ed an adverse
6-2 jury verdict, holding that their remaining properties
had sustained no "severance" damages.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE VARIOUS FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO SEVERANCE DA~IAGES IN
AN EMINENT DOMAIN ACTION DO NOT
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HAVE TO BE SPECIAL AND UNIQUE FROM
THOSE SUSTAINED BY OTHER PROPERTIES IN 'l'HE GENERAL NEIGHBORHOOD
IN ORDER TO BE CONSIDERED.
Throughout the trial of this matter the trial judge
repeatedly furnished the jury with illustrations of situations where land owners could not recover damages
to their remaining properties in eminent domain actions
-even though a portion of their lands had actually
been taken - unless the damages to their remaining
properties were unusual or unique to the neighborhood
in general. For instance, one of the several remarks made
to the jury during the course of the trial was as follows
(Tr. 43):
" . . . whether these people are so closely involved in this project because they have lost this
piece of land, it h£U to be unique in the neighborhood so that their difference is a genuine severance damage. This will be a fact question that
you will have to determine.
(Italics added)

* * *

"Now, whether this case is severance damage
or consequential damage is for you to deter·
.
mme.
(Tr. 42)

.

In the Court's instructions to the jury at the con·
clusion of the trial, the same requirement was impressed
on the jury that damages to the remaining properties
of the defendants must be unique and different from
the type of damage which others in the neighborhood
8

might suffer in order to constitute severance damage.
In Instruction No, 7, the Court first correctly informed
the jury that the method to be employed in determining
damages to the remaining property of the defendants
would be to consider the value of the remaining property before the severance of the part acquired and,
secondly, the value of the remaining property after
severance. This statement substantially states the general rule of the measure of damages to remaining properties which is followed in Utah. However, in the
second and last paragraph of Instruction No. 7 the
following incorrect statement of law was added by Lhe
Court over defendants' objection:
"This is true if the loss in value is the result
of severing part of the land from the whole
thereof and construction of the project as designed; but it is not true if the loss in value is
in part, or entirely, because of the projects
(project's) presents (presence) in the general
area independant (independent) of this taking
of the defendants' land not sufficiently related
thereto so as to situation the defendant land
owner differently then (than) neighbors who
have not lost lands." (R. 38-7)

It is submitted that the trial judge was clearly
wrong in his statements to the jury regarding severance
damages, both as to comments made during trial and
in Instruction No. 7, in requiring that such damages
must be unique and different from those suffered by
other properties in the neighborhood. It is further submitted that the trial judge completely confused the
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rule with respect to severance damages with the rule
applicable in cases involving consequential damages.
In order to properly understand the issue presented
in this portion of the argument, it is well to define our
terms and to examine past Utah Supreme Court decisions in the field of eminent domain. Section 78-34-10,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, outlines three pertinent
sub-sections relating to the types of compensation and
damages to be awarded in an eminent domain proceeding. These sub-sections will here be separately listed,
with a statement in parenthesis under each indicating
the type of compensation or damage which is present
for classification purposes:

(1) The value is the property sought to be con-

demned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and
every separate estate or interest therein;
and if it consists of different parcels, the
value of each parcel and of each estate or
interest therein shall be separately assessed.
(This is compensation for the TAKING)

(2) If the property sought to be condemned

constitutes only a part of a larger parcel,
the damages which will accrue to the portion
not sought to be condemned by reason of
its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the
plaintiff.
(This is SEVERANCE damage)
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( 3) If the property, though no part thereof is
taken, will be damaged by the construction
of the proposed improvement, the amount
of such damages.
(This is CONSEQUENTIAL damage)
Our Utah Supreme Court has consistently followed the foregoing classification of damages in its
rnrious deciisons in recent years. In the case of Springville Banking Company v. Burton (1960) 10 U. 2d
100, 349 P. 2d 1.57, wherein no property was actually
taken, but a street was divided in front of appellant's
business establishment by the placement of concrete
islands therein, this Court clearly held that such an
action involved damages which were consequential in
nature:
"We espouse the notion that if the sovereign
exercises its police power reasonably and for the
good of all the peo_ple, when constructing highways, the consequential damages such as those
alleged here, are not compensable."
Similarly, in the case of Fairclough v. Salt Lake
County (1960) 10 U. 2d 417, 354 P. 2d 105, the highway grade was reduced about 16 feet below the property
owner's abutting land, without there being an actual
taking of his property. Again, this Court recognized
the situation as one involving consequential damages.
Further, in the case of Parker (Sine) v. State Road
Commission (1962), 13 U.2d 65, 368 P. 2d 585, wherein
there was no actual taking of affected properties, the
distinction between severance and consequential damages was again brought out:
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"Contentions ( l) and ( 3) may be viewed in
the aggregate, since both pose the same fundamental question whether the State is suable for
consequential damage to property not sought for
condemnation."
In the developme11t of our Utah eminent domain
law it is the present rule that cases involving consequential damages wherein the State of Utah is or might
be a party litigant in court are controlled by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, which places the State of
Utah beyond the grasp of the law. In short, under
sub-section ( 3) of Section 78-34-10, supra, the State
of Utah cannot be brought into court by any means
whatever (except in rare cases), and consequential
damages can only be secured by property owners
against condemning authorities unable to get under the
cloak of sovereign immunity, such as railroads and
similarly situated utilities and agencies having eminent
domain authority.
The distinction between severance damages and
consequential damages has best been illustrated in Utah
in the case of Board of Education of Logan City v.
Croft (1962), 13 U. 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697, involving
the condemnation of certain lands for school grounds
purposes. In that case the jury verdict form provided
for damages in three parts - for the value of lands
taken, for severance damages, and for consequential
damages. In analyzing the situation this Court held
that there could be no award for consequential damages
since the award for severance damages "covered" and
included consequential damages.
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As a matter of fact, under the distinction between
severance damages and consequential damages spelled
out by our statute and the foregoing court decisions,
there could never be both severance and consequential
damage evidence in the same case where a partial taking
occurs. Consequently, the trial judge's comment to the
jury during the trial of this case constitutes an incorrect statement of the law:
"It is possible for the same piece of land to
suffer both consequential damages, which is not
recoverable, and severance damages ... I will
leave that to the jury."
(Tr. 43)

A careful reading of the Croft case clearly points
out the errors which the trial judge in this case adopted,
in (a) failing to properly distinguish between severance damages and consequential damages, and (b) in
failing to realize that the same elements and items of
damages are not applicable to each. In the Croft case
this entire matter was answered in one paragraph, as
follows:
"Damages to land, by the construction of a
public or industrial improvement, though no part
thereof is taken as provided for under 78-34-10
( 3), contrary to the rule for severance damages,
is limited to injuries that would be actionable
at common law, or where there has been some
physical disturbance of a right, either public
or private ,which the owner enjoys in connection
with his prQoerty and which gives it additional
yalue, and ~ich causes him to sustain a special
damage with respect to his property in excess
of that sustained by the public generally. It re-
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quires a definite physical injury cognizable to
the sense with a perceptible effect on the present
market value; such as drying up wells and
springAJ destroying lateral supports, preventing
surface waters from running off adjacent lands,
or the depositing of cinders and other foreign
materials on neighboring lands by the permanent
operation of the business or improvement established on the adjoining lands."
(I talics added)
The foregoing statement clearly explains what type
of injury constitutes consequential damages. Further,
it clearly states that the measure of severance damages
is not restricted and limited as with those situations
involving consequential damages; and in support thereof adopts the rule from 2 Nichols on Eminent Domain
326, Sec. 6.411 ( 1). As pointed out by Nichols in his
general discussion of the subject (Sec. 6.441 - Sec.
6.4432 ( 2) ) , consequential damages must be special
and unique from those generally sustained in the general neighborhood; while severance damages are not so
restricted and follow the general valuation rule set
down in the case of Weber Basin v. Ward (1959), 10
U. 2d 29, 347 P. 2d 862, as follows:
" ... all factors bearing upon ... value that
any prudent purchaser would take into account
... should be given consideration, ... "
A case of recent vintage from South Carolina will
be cited at this point to further illustrate the error of
the trial court's thinking that severance damages must
be special and unique in the neighborhood in order to
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be considered. In South Carolina Highway Dept. v.
Touchberry ( 1966) , 148 SE 2d 747, the general rule
is quoted from 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec.
14.l at page 473:
"A distinction must be drawn between consequential* damages to a remainder area where
part of a tract is physically appropriated and
consequential damages to a tract no part of
which is physically appropriated. In the latte:r
case the damage must be peculiar to such land
and not such as is suffered in common with the
general public. In the former case it matters not
that the in;ury is suffered in common with the
general public."
(Italics added)
*This type of "consequential damage" is defined by statute as 'severance' damage in
Utah. Nichols points out (Sec. 6.4432) that,
broadly speaking, " ... all damages must of
necessity be consequential since all damage
is the consequence of an injurious act."
In State Highway Commission v. Bloom, 93 N.W.
2d 572 (S. D. 1958), the court cited 18 Am. Jur.,
Eminent Domain, Sec. 265, and said on page 577:
"But where a part of an owner's parcel or
tract of land is taken for a public improvement
such as a public highway the owner is entitled
to be compensation for the part taken and for
consequential damages to the part not taken
even though the consequential damage is of a
kind suffered by the public in common."
(I talics added)
In the Bloom case the court went on to hold that
for the purpose of determining severance damage to
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the part not taken, the part of defendant's land taken
is to be considered as an integral and inseparable part
of a single highway project not limited to the segment
of the highway on his land.
27 Am. J ur. 2d, E1nine nt Domain (which is the
present counterpart of 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain,
Sec. 265), at Section 310, p. 124 elaborates on the fore-

going rule:

"Where part of a parcel of land is taken by
eminent domain, the owner is not restricted to
compensation for the land actually taken; he is
also entitled to recover for the damage to his
remaining land. In other words, he is entitled
to full compensation for the taking of his land
and all its consequences, and the right to recover
for the damage to his remaining land is not
based upon the theory that damage to such land
constitutes a taking of it, nor is there any requirement that the damage be special and peculiar, or such as would be actionable at common
law; it is enough that it is a consequence of the
taking · · · "
(I talics added)
There are numerous cases from other states setting
forth the foregoing rule, but the law is so clear as to
require no further emphasis in this writer's opinion.
There is a sound practical reason why there should
be no attempt to segregate factors contributing to
severance damages on the basis of whether or not such
factors are unique to the affected property or whether
such factors generally, equally or to some lesser degree,
affect other lands in the vicinity. Following the "before-

16

1

and-after" rule, which is the general rule applied in
determining severance damages in Utah, an appraiser
compares the remaining property not taken as it was
in its former condition as part of the whole, and as it
subsequently exists in its severed condition. From this
comparison he forms an opinion as to the total difference in market value caused by the taking and the construction of the public improvement in the manner
contemplated. This difference, or "severance" damage,
is not an amount of money which he or a jury can
usually separate with any degree of precision so as to
point out what portion of the damage might be attribut·
able to one factor and what portion might be attribut·
able to another factor. The problem becomes readily
apparent, and the resulting confusion from such an
attempt would almost always produce ridiculous results.
In short, such an approach would clearly abandon the
"before-and-after" rule of damages to remaining properties which remain in their severed condition, and a
trial would degenerate into a knit-picking expedition.
'\T orse still, most trials would get so involved with the
issue of whether or not a neighboring property not
involved in court proceedings sustained greater or lesser
damages-and the degree of such damage-as actually
happened in this trial, that other people's problems
would become the greater part of a trial. The obvious
prejudice to the involved litigant becomes readily
apparent.
The trial of this case actually illustrated the very
problem just mentioned since the plaintiff, with the
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approval of the trial judge, went into substantial detail
attempting to show that other residences and properties
on the west side of the freeway-and also being on the
north side of Seventh Street-sustained damages by
reason of the construction project. The State's appraiser
pointed out that he felt there were three homes on the
west side of the freeway sustaining somewhat the same
type of damage due to the construction of the overpass and the location of the homes on a dead-end street
(Tr. 70-71), to which defendants' witness Barlow
pointed out that, although at least one of the homes
across the freeway sustained some damage caused by
being on a dead-end road, the damage sustained by
the defendants' properties was much worse, and that
there was no real similarity at all (Tr. 88). Actually,
the most affected residence on the west side of the freeway was 118 feet from the toe of the freeway fill (as
compared with a distance of 79 feet from the toe of
the fill to the defendants' residence), since the location
of the overpass fill on the west side of the freeway was
placed entirely beyond the south right-of-way line of
what was formerly Seventh Street. Likewise, while the
defendants' residence faced an embankment of 17 feet,
the most affected residence on the west side of the freeway-which was located 118 feet from the toe of the
fill-was only faced with an embankment of 6' 9". The
dissimilarity and degree of damage was major between
the properties of these defendants and any other property similarly affected across the freeway but, as pointed
out in Instruction No. 7, since another property not
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involved in a condemnation action sustained a damage
-though lesser in degree-of a similar nature to that
sustained by these defendants' properties, the jury
could well find as it did.
On the general subject of attempting to segregate
and place values upon different factors contributing to
damage to remaining properties, the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court of New York (1967) in the case
of Dennison v. State, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 257, pointed out
that a consideration of noise as a factor contributing
to damages was not separable from other concededly
legitimate factors, and therefore, was not subject to
a valuation by the Appellant Court. It also pointed out
that the inter-relation of noise with elements such as
vision and privacy would have made it impossible to
attribute a separate specific amount to noise. However,
the issue was resolved since the court held noise was
properly considered a factor of damage caused by the
construction of a new highway.
Having covered the distinction between severance
and consequential damages under Utah law, it now
becomes necessary to analyze the facts of this case to
determine which type of damage situation presented
itself here. There is absolutely no dispute but that the
State Road Commission instituted a condemnation
action against these defendants, and that it had to do
so because it was acquiring specific fee title interests
in and to .89 acre of their real properties. An examination of the Trial l\'Iap (Exh. A) indicates that the
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plaintiff condemned a strip of land running along the
south side of their larger holding of approximately 23
acres. The lands actually taken included a strip of
land varying between 30 feet to 40 feet in width, lying
between the center line of Seventh Street and the enclosed or occupied area of defendants' holdings (within
which taken area of public easement for highway purposes had been created over the years), plus a wider
strip extending into a portion of the defendants'
holdings to which no public easement had ever been
created-thereby providing a route whereby defendants
could secure access onto the re-constructed Seventh
Street which passed over the Interstate Freeway.
There can be no doubt whatever that the State of
Utah was properly in court; in fact, it had to bring
the action to acquire the properties taken in the litigation. In addition, since the construction of the project
in the area deprived defendants of their former means
of ingress and egress to Seventh Street which they had
used for a great many years (See Exhibits D-1 and
D-2, which show the condition of the affected premises
prior to any construction) , plus the construction of
a 17 foot fill directly in front of the home of the defendants, there was also a taking of property rights
of light and view, and of access. These special items
of taking will be discussed in the next section.
At this point it is well to analyze the factual situation to determine whether, as the lower Court felt,
this case comes within the doctrine of sovereign immu20

nity under the case of State Road Commission v. Parker
(Sine), 1962, 13 U. 2d 65, 368 P. 2d 585. The trial
judge, after extensive exceptions were taken to the
Instructions by defendants' counsel, stated (Tr. 112 ) "I think the Syms (Sine) case, I'm adopting
the position and the interpretation of the Syms'
case to be that the vulnerability of the state to
damages in this proceeding are not greater; does
not reach matters which are not related to the
severance. The mere fact that they are in court
does not expand the general scope. This is my
interpretation of the Syms' case."

* * *

"I appreciate the fact that there is a great deal
of difference in the interpretation between counsel as to the law applicable to this case."

In the Sine case the State Road Commission constructed its freeway system crossing N,orth Temple
Street near the SeRancho Motel in Salt Lake City.
The freeway missed the motel property on the north
side of North Temple Street, but it was necessary to
acquire a portion of a residential property located on
the south side of North Temple Street, which was
owned by the same property owners. When the State
Road Commission brought action to condemn a portion
of the residential property, Sine filed a counter-claim
to secure "consequential damage" to the SeRancho
Motel property. In dismissing the counter-claim on
the basis of sovereign immunity under the authority
of Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra, this Court.
pointed out that the " . . . motel property (had) no
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economic or f nnctional connection with . . . " the residential property. This Court further pointed out that
by means of a counter-claim a litigant cannot cast himself in any other role than that of a plaintiff.
Defendants submit that there is not the slightest
comparison on the facts between the Sine case and this
matter. The plaintiff in this case certainly felt that
the properties here being taken were part and parcel
of an integrated unit holding, as illustrated by its trial
map (Exh. A), its identical exhibit attached to its
complaint (R. 1-Exh. A-Y), and in its very pleading
in the Complaint (R. 1-11), wherein it stated:
"6. That the parcels of real property sought
to be condemned, ... are but a part of an entire
parcel or tract or piece of property, or interest
therein or to property owned by aforesaid defendants."

Consistently, in their Answer these defendants did
not set forth any counter-claim (as happened in the
Sine case), but affirmatively answered the Complaint
(R. 18) and asserted damages to their residence and
remaining tract of land, and specifically pointed out
that their access to Seventh Street had been destroyed,
that a 17 foot fill had been placed in front of their home,
that their frontage had been interfered with, and that
they had been left with their home on a dead-end street.
The matter went to trial with no attempt on plaintiff's
part to assert sovereign immunity or to otherwise strike
these damage claims from the proceedings.

22

As to whether the remammg properties of these
defendants had any "economic or functional" connection
with the portion taken, by way of making comparisons
with the Sine case, it appears self evident that the home
and contiguous land holdings of these defendants were
highly related in use and value to Seventh Street which
ran along the front of their properties, and to the
specific areas taken from them in Seventh Street and
beyond Seventh Street. Further, since the plaintiff
was condemning a strip of land in the public street to
which these defendants held fee title for many years
-which carried with it a corresponding annual l)bligation to make payment of property taxes - the use
of their home and the surrounding lands was highly
integrated with and dependent upon an obstructed
access to Seventh Street and the right to have uninterrupted use of their easements of light and view.
To say that this case presents a situation analogous
lo the Sine case in view of the clear-cut visible facts
would be to carry the principle of that case to an absurd
and ridiculous extreme. Further, a holding that sovereign immunity could possibly exist under the factual
situation here present would undoubtedly open the door
to the State's claiming sovereign immunity in probably
half of the pending and future highway cases, with
resulting chaos. Despite actual takings of property,
the State could then attempt to claim that sovereign
immunity existed because there was no "substantial"
taking, or that damages could not be considered unless
of a type unusual and unique as compared with those
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sustained by other property owners in the neighborhood. Such a holding would simply flood this court with
future appeals from both sides.
Although the State's appraiser did not find any
"severance" damage to the remaining property (Tr.
68), following the views of the Court and stating that
there were three homes on the west side of the freeway
(and on the north of Seventh Street) which had also
been somewhat similarly affected by the overpass structure (Tr. 70-71) , the land owners' appraiser, Haven
J. Barlow, found substantial severance damages-utilizing the contrary definition of severance which did not
require the damages to the affected properties to be
different and unique to this particular property as distinguished from others in the neighborhood (Tr. 28,
39, 41). Mr. Barlow attributed damages to the affected
Stanger holdings in the amount of $5,806.00 (Tr. 38),
resulting from the following factors: A portion of
the property (including the home) was now left on a
dead-end street; mail service, garbage service and similar services would no longer be available as before; the
17 foot fill (located 79 feet from the home) was unsightly and practically eliminated all view from the
front of the home; that there was a degree of hazard
created by the high overpass; and that there was a substantial loss of privacy (Tr. 44-48).
He felt that the home and lot, plus two adversely
affected acres lying immediately east of the home, were
originally worth $18,896.50 (Tr. 35), but that because

24

of the factors entering into a reduction in value of those
same properties, they were worth $13,090.00 after the
taking - or a total severance damage of $5,806.00
(Tr. 38).
Plaintiff will undoubtedly claim that the jury
found there was no severance damages to the remaining
properties of the Stangers. In anticipation of such an
argument, the jury verdict form, and answers, is here
reproduced (Instruction No. 8) :
You are instructed that your award will be
determined as follows:
1. The loss in value to the defendants'
remaining land and improvements because of the severance of the land taken
and the construction of the project as designed, is, if any ........................................ $ -0-

2. How much of the above, if any, are
severance damages ...................................... $ -03. How much, if any, of the above are
non-compensatory incidental damages .... $ -0Dated this 2t8h day of June, 1967.
Sid L. W. Kasting
Jury Foreman
Answering any argument plaintiff might make
that the insertion of the amount "None" in answer to
the first question of the verdict form has significance
in this case, the following points are submitted as explanatory of the jury's finding:
1. Under Instruction No. 7 it was made clear
to the jury that there could be no "severance"
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damages unless defendants had sustained damages unique and different from those of neighbors who had not actually lost lands;
2. Throughout the trial the Court interrupted
the proceedings to furnish the jury with many
illustrations of situations where damages could
not be secured because of actions affecting streets
and highways (Tr. 42, 43); as to whether loss
of view was a "consequential damage" common
to the neighborhood ... or a true severance q uestion (Tr. 45) ; the inability of Slim Olson to
recover damages to his business because of the
moving of the highway (Tr. 82) ; that the large
motel (Se R~ncho) in Salt Lake City could not
recover since there was no taking even though
they "broke the motel" (Tr. 94); asking the
jury to determine if other people on the west
side of the freeway from the Stangers had in
fact sustained economic loss and, if so, implying
that any such situation would bar recovery by
these defendants (Tr. 43, 94 )-all of which
heavily impressed the jury as to the Court's
thinking in this case.
3. The appraiser for the State found no damages by way of "severance" (Tr. 68) , since he
obviously was following the same test relative
to severance damages used by the Court in that
they must be "special and unique" in the neighborhood; and he elaborated extensively on somewhat similarly situated homes located on the west
side of the freeway (Tr. 70-71 ) .
4. The jury had no basis for segregating items
of damage inasmuch as neither appraiser atJ
tempte d to segregate namages
as to " severance "
items vs. "consequential" items, or as between
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either of the foregoing and "non-compensatory
incidental damages."
5. The verdict form, as written by the trial
judge, when taken with the instructions in general, is submitted by this writer to be both legally
incorrect and gramatically confusing; that this,
in part, undoubtedly concerned the jury arriving at its 6-2 decision.

II.
THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS INAPPLICABLE IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES \VHERE SEVERANCE DA.MAGES RESULT FROM THE TAKING OF
RE AL PROPERTY, OR ESTABLISHED
EASEMENTS OR OTHER RIGHTS APPURTENANT TO REAL PROPERTY.
The logical end result of the lower Court's confusion between severance damages and consequential
damages, and the damage factors applicable to each,
logically extended itself into a belief that-after allthis case was really one where the doctrine of sovereign
immunity should be applied. Support for this proposition is clearly evident from the lower Court's previously quoted statement that he felt the Syms' (Sine)
case controlled this case. Further, the verdict form bears
out this observation.
To further distinguish this case from State Road
Commission v. Parker (Sine), 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P 2d
li85, here the affected and damaged properties of these
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defendants were directly tied to the fee title and established easement interests being taken. Specifically, as
previously pointed out, these defendants owned onehalf of Seventh Street in its original condition in fee
simple; similarly, and notwithstanding any fee title
interest, they had traveled directly from their home and
garage area to and from Seventh Street in its previously unaltered condition, and their residence enjoyed
an unobstructed easement of light and view. It would
serve no real purpose here to quote from the many
cases in Utah and from other jurisdictions recognizing
such properly rights, particularly since the 1963 legislative revisions to the Highway Code in Utah clearly
recognize and authorize the acquisition for highway
purposes of just such interests:
27-12-96 ACQUISITION OF RIGHTSOF-W AY AND OTHER REAL PROPER TY - The commission is authorized to acquire any real property or interests therein,
deemed necessary for temporary, present, or
reasonable future state highway purposes by
gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise. Highway purposes as used in
this act shall include, but shall not be limited
to the following:
( 3) Limited access facilities, inclnding rights
of access, air, light and view, and frontage and
service roads to highways.
In the case of Utah Road Commission v. Hansen
(1963) 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917, this Court observed that-
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" . . .an easement of access contemplates a
traveled way from the property to the highway."
"Absent an established easement, all the abutting owner is entitled to is some reasonable means
of access to the highways . . . "
"We are aware that in the case of Dooly Block
v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit Co. (9 U. 31, 33
P 229) this Court stated that an owner whose
property abuts an established public street had
an easement of access thereto, and we agree that
where such is taken it would constitute the taking of property covered by our eminent domain
statute ... "
Since defendants used the former Seventh Street
for purposes of ingress and egress for a great many
years, by what process of reasoning can it be said that
a property right had not been condemned and taken
from them because they were furnished with another
route to the same street by a greatly inferior means of
access and which left their properties on a dead-end
street? It is submitted that the trial judge completely
disregarded the Hansen case in this instance.

i

The Hansen case states that a reasonable access
to the highway system should be accorded all properties, but aside from the factual issue as to whether or
not an access is or is not reasonable it clearly holds
that establi.shed easements of access must be considered
in the severance damage analysis. Further, with respect
to the north half of Seventh Street, these defendants
owned fee title, and the only interest in that street
which the public had acquired was a public easement
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of travel. This was clearly recognized here because the
plaintiff determined it necessary to condemn the fee
interest in the street.
Plaintiff may attempt to claim that the actual
physical construction of the overpass fill in front of
defendants' residence did not extend north of the original center line of Seventh Street into the fee title area
which defendants previously owned, thereby leaving
the defendants "half" of the original Seventh Street
fully available to them at that point. However, such
an argument completely fails to establish any material
point of advantage for many reasons, among which are
these:
I. The portion of the original Seventh Street

now left defendants' use is actually no longer
"Seventh Street" -- it is now a dead-end
"service" road;

2. By acquiring fee title to the north half of

what was formerly Seventh Street, the plaintiff acquired full rights to that area, including its use for maintenance of the overpass
fill (Tr. 12); and

3. Complete dominion was thereby acquired by

plaintiff to place fill in any portion of the
green area, which plaintiff's engineer indicated might be the case along the easterly portion of the green area being condemned
(Tr. 11).

In any eminent domain proceeding it is a simple
matter for the condemning authority to limit the right,
or the extent of the right, being taken. Whenever a fee

30

or au easement taking occurs the courts have uniformly
held that it must be presumed that the taking was
calculated with the intention that the rights acquired
would be exercised in the most injurious manner legally
possible. Courts have consistently taken a dim view of
arguments advanced by condemning authorities based
on the premise that, although they were taking a complete fee title, their intentions were not to fully utilize
such rights acquired and, therefore, that the damages
should only be measured by the "intended" use which
they then planned to make. See Richardson v. Big
Indian District (N ebraska-1967), 151 N .\V. 2d 283;
Sullivan v. Marcello (R. I.-1966), 214 A. 2d 181; and
People v. Lundy (California-1966), 47 Cal. Rep. 694.
The cases involving damages where there have
been actual takings of property-thereby avoiding the
problem of sovereign immunity-have substantially
ruled that "viaduct-fill and dead-end" situations give
rise to severance damages as a matter of law. The
measure of such damages is, of course, always a matter
of determination.
In the case of Weber Basin District v. Gailey
(1956), 5 U. 2d 385, 303 P. 2d 271, it was observed
that" ... we have held that a change in the grade
of an adjoining highway and the building of a
viaduct in the adjoining street inflicted compensable damages to the property of the adjoining landowner."
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The foregoing rule was probably best set forth in
the case of State Road Com,mission v. Fourth District
Court (1937), 94 U. 384, 78 P. 2d 502, which involved
the building of a viaduct along Center Street in Provo,
Utah. The factual comparison is generally identical
with this case, except that it did not appear in the
Fourth District Court case that there was any necessity
that the State Road Commission acquire any properties
from any of the defendants abutting the affected street,
thus distinguishing the two cases insofar as this Court's
present view of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
involved. In passing on the facts presented in that
case, this Court stated:
"We think it clear that the framers of the constitution did not intend to give the rights granted
by Section 22, and then leave the citizen powerless to enforce such rights. We hold that this is
so whether the injury complained of by the
Plaintiff's in the injunction suit is considered a
'taking' of property or a 'damaging' of property. The framers of the fundamental law, after
much debate and careful consideration of the
hardship of the old rule which allowed compensation only in the case of a taking of property,
wrote into the constitution a provision by which
we think they intended to guarantee to the landowner whose property is damaged just compensation with the same certainty as to the landowner whose property is physically taken."
In the case of Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid
Transit Co. (1893) 9 U. 31, 33 P. 229, our Court long
ago recognized that, when properly in court, a land-
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owner could recover for established rights of easement
interfered with by condemning authorities:
"It would seem that he (abutting property
owner) had, in common with the rest of the public a right of passage but it was also further
seen that he had rights not shared by the public
at large, special and peculiar to himself, and
which arose out of the relation of his lot to the
street in front of it; and that these rights, whether
the bare fee of the street was in the lot owner
or in the city, were rights of property, and as
such, ought to be, and were, sacred from legislative invasion as his right to the lot itself."

In this case the defendants submitted to the Court
an Instruction covering the basic factual situation involved. The proposed instruction was denied by the
Court, and exception was duly taken. It fallows:
"Under the law of the State of Utah a landowner having prop~rties bordering a street or
highway is entitled to recover damages sustained
by his adjoining properties if the grade of the
street or highway is substantially changed, either
by the placement or removal of fill material in
the roadway area or by the building of a viaduct,
overpass or similar structure. In determining
the amount of damages to the adjoining properties in view of their highest and best use ur
uses, you may consider the effect of such change
in grade on the various factors which would be
considered ~y willing buyers and sellers in determining market value."
Defendants submit that the refusal to give the
foregoing instruction, since the issues were properly
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before the court and the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was not available to the plaintiff, was clear error. In
lieu of the proposed instruction the Court gave its instruction No. 10 (R. 39), attempting to cover generally
the same law and subject matter. This writer will leave
to the Court the problem of analyzing the Instruction
actually given if it so desires - to which exceptions
were taken by defendants on the basis of containing
incorrect statements of law and of being inapplicable to
the facts of this case. It is felt that a complete analysis
of the Instruction would probably not result in
lessening the confusion created by the Instruction as
written.
It does not require extensive analysis to understand
why courts in general have been greatly disturbed with
the effect upon market value caused by these "viaductfill and dead-end" situations. The effect of such obstructions and their interference with access and view have
been the subjects of extensive court opinions and comments in recent years in a great number of cases from
other jurisdictions. In the case of Dennison v. State
(New York-1966), 265 N. Y. S. 2d 671, that Court
extensively reviewed and commented upon the adverse
effect upon the value of a home caused by a highway
embankment being constructed in front of it. In
DuPuy v. City of Waco (Texas-1966), 396 S. W. 2d
103, that Court held that where a property owner had
full access to a level abutting street and where highway
construction had created an elevated overpass in its
place at a height of 14 feet, thereby requiring the

34

i.

property owner to get access through a service route
which left the property in a dead-end, or cul-de-sac,
such interference with access entitled the landowner
to get damages as a matter of law. Even as to warehouse properties, the case of People v. Wasserman
(Calif.-1966), 50 Cal. Rep. 95, recognized that an
easement of reasonable view of one's property from the
highway to the property is a valuable property right
which, if existing, entitles the property owner to compensation. Space does not permit commenting upon
the great number of cases recognizing these property
interests.
The Utah Rule set forth in the Fourth District
Court case is stated in 26 Am. J ur. 2d, Sec. 242, P. 931,
as follows:
" ... many courts hold that an owner is entitled to compensation where all access from his
property to the system of streets in one direction
is cut off, so that his property is left at the end
of a cul-de-sac, at least where the market 'value
of the property is lessened thereby. An abutting
owner on a public street has been said to have
a special right and a vested interest in the right
to use the whole of the street for ingress and
egress, light, view, and air, and that if the vacation of a portion of the street opposite his property should materially diminish his light, air,
view, or access, he has a right to have the amount
of damage determined by the jury."
(Nichols on Eminent Domain is in accordSec. 16.101 (5))
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The concept of sovereign immunity in such situations is not in issue since such takings directly and
substantially affect contiguous properties having both
a functional and economic relationship. Perhaps, as
Justice \Vade observed in the Fairclough case in his
dissent, had there been no need for the taking of any
land from these defendants, they might be in the position of having no remedy by virtue of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, since there was not a total destruction of access so as to invoke principles of equityas observed by Justice IIenriod in the Springville Banking Company case. Nevertheless, this writer intends to
make some observations concerning the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in eminent domain cases inasmuch
as it was a factor which actually entered into the trial
of this case.
Rather than boldly advance a possibly unpopular
suggestion to this Court that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity advanced in the Fairclough case is wrong in
eminent domain cases, and that Utah stands practically
alone-as it really does-in "inverse" condemnation
situations among those states providing constitutional
mandates that just compensation shall be made for
properties taken "or damaged", this writer will point
out some of the awkward results which the courtadopted concept of sovereign immunity creates in eminent domain situations.
Once the doctrine of sovereign immunity is adopted
by any court in eminent domain cases with constitu-
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tional mand;ttes similar to those of Utah, the problem
alwa) s becomes one of where to draw the line. Until
this instant case came along, it possibly could have
been said with reasonable certainty that sovereign immunity in eminent domain cases ceas~d to apply once
the condemning state agency actually acquired a property interest in a court action, thereby submitting itself
to the court's jurisdiction and effecting a waiver of its
sovereign: immunity. Of course, the foregoing statement is made with full knowledge of the factual limitions of the Sine case. Thus, a property owner whose
lands have been taken in part is in a position to recover
damages to his remaining properties which are f unctionally or economically affected via the route of severance damages. On the other hand, a property owner
in the position of Fairclough (except in situations
where the action might leave him landlocked) i!) powerless tb recover any damages. The illustration just given
shows the two extremes; but the intermediate grey
' areas will show how ridiculous the concept of sovereign
immunity becomes in actual practice.
Several years ago a highway department in the
State of Oregon constructed a road through a rancher's
property, and refused to instigate eminent domain proceedings or to make arrangements to purchase the properties. 'Ve can certainly assume that this would be the
classic example of a state's sovereign immunity or,
bluntly stated, "thumbing the nose". However, the
enraged property owner, being advised that the courts
were not going to help him at all, barricaded both ends
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of the road where it crossed his properties, erected a
headquarters in the middle of the road, put a rifle on
his lap, and dared anyone to trespass upon his land~.
Despite a great amount of publicity and the usual
threats by impressive public officials with a lot of governmental power behind them, the matter finally resolved itself into that of making a settlement with the
property owner. It seemed that no one wanted to get
shot-including state officials-for the deliberate trespass, and the state was sort of "smoked out."
The foregoing story quite accurately illustrates the
situation in Utah today and, in this writer's opinion,
points out how absurd the doctrine of sovereign immu·
nity can become in these eminent domain cases. Simply
stated, in about 99% of' the cases (other than those
within the limited range of the "Utah Governmental
Immunity Act") the only "taking'' situations where
the State of Utah is presently vulnerable to damages
are those where it requires a physical surface or suv·
surface use of a property in the form of a fee title or
an easement interest. This statement will bear up under
close scrutiny. This writer makes the further observa·
tion that the State of Utah (nudged along by the U.S.
Bureau of' Public Roads) could and would, within the
protection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity now
prevailing in Utah, even take fee title and easement
rights without payment of' compensation, except for
either or both of two basic reasons: (I) That some
higher authority requires that there be a transfer of
title to a legal interest in real property in order to
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satisfy title and conveyancing requirements; or ( 2)
the property owner could physically utilize self-help,
notwithstanding the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The foregoing observations are blunt, to-the-point,
and accurate. Sovereign immunity permits the State
in many situations to acquire, damage or destroy rights
and easements of access, light and view, and similar
property rights which a property-owner may have without going to court or paying compensation. There is
a taking of property when such rights are acquired
just as much and real in the eyes of the law as if the
surface or sub-surface physical use of a property is
involved.
In support of the foregoing, 26 Am. J ur. 2d,
Eminent Domain, Sec. 200, p. 882, states"As a general thing, where the easements of
access, light, air, and view are recognized in an
abutting owner, the devotion of the adjacent
street or highway to inconsistent uses destructive
of such easements is a taking of property within
a constitutional provision requiring compensation therefor . . ."
(Italics added)
In short, easement rights in the nature of appurtenances can often be taken in Utah by the State with\ out payment of just compensation as provided by our
Constitution, as well as consequential damages to properties not taken. If we re-analyze the aforementioned
three sub-sections of Section 78-34-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
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often denies all manner of compensation to a propertv
owner when a State taking occurs unless there has been
an underlying fee title taking, or an easement taking
- except in possible rare cases as mentioned in the
Springville Banking Co. case. Actually, the very recognition of such an exception constitutes an effective
admission that sovereign immunity is a make-shift
proposition completely out of harmony with the Constitution. Unless such types of actual takings occur,
all and every other manner of damage set forth in the
three sub-sections of that statutory section fall before
sovereign immunity.

A further practical analysis of property rights

taken, such as light and air, access, etc., reveals that it,
is virtually impossible to place a dollar value upon such i
property rights. Any qualified valuation appraiser
will, and must, value these property rights in relation
to the remaining affected properties. This is proper
appraisal practice and technique; in fact, it is usually :
the only method by which such rights can be valued, I
since these rights are appurtenances to the remaining
properties after a taking has occurred.
I

1

1

•

The appraisal problem presents a practical reason
why sovereign immunity must not apply in severance
situations involving damages to the remaining prop·
erties where there has been a taking of a portion of
the property. But the same reasoning applies, notwith·
standing the prior position taken by a majority of this
Court, in all cases where damage occurs to properties
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not taken and where there has not been a taking of a
portion of the property. If Section 22 of Article I of
our Utah Constitution has any significance at all, there
can be no answer but that sovereign immunity has no
place in the picture :
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation."

Any other conclusion will eventually create mount' ing confusion in the eminent domain law.
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States provides" ... nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Since a State acts through its courts, and inasmuch
as the courts in Utah sanction the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in taking or damaging situations of all types
: other than the exceptions previously noted, how can it
I be said that there is not a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in permitting the taking of property rights
under sovereign immunity? Further, where is the equal
protection of the laws which permits one property
owner to recover where a portion of his properties are
taken, but which denies recovery to another property
owner sustaining identical damages but having no properties taken? It is submitted that the doctrine of sovereign immunity will not stand up against our State and
Federal Constitutional mandates.
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CONCLUSION
The argument and analysis in this brief quite pos- :
sibly has extended beyond that which is necessary to
a reversal in view of the basic errors made by the lower
Court and counsel for plaintiff associated with the con- :.
fusion between "severance" and "consequential" damages. Further, the additional inter-related issue of sovereign immunity which was interjected into the case
raises a specter of ominous proportions for the property
owners, their lawyers and the courts in this State if
the legal errors are not clearly corrected in this decision.
Since 1958 this writer has personally handled 165
eminent domain cases involving court condemnations
of properties and property rights primarily related to
river and reservoir projects, community utilities, national park and recreational acquisitions, and highway
acquisitions. Of this number, 120 cases have gone
through trial. If indications received from officials of
the Federal Bureau of Public Roads are meaningful,
this writer has handled more cases involving condemnation acquisitions for property owners since 1960 than
possibly any other attorney in the nation. This information is advanced because of assertions made in this
brief as to the results which probably will occur if this
case is not reversed.
It is not a pleasant prospect to imagine the trouble
which will occur in our courts if, in condemnation
actions involving the State of Utah where there has
been an actual taking of a portion of one's property,
42
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the dispute degenerates into a search for other affected
properties in the vicinity which are not involved in
actual takings but which have sustained somewhat similar type damages, in part, to those sustained by the
defendant litigant. To imagine the problems involved
in arguing the degree of comparative damage (which
would have meaningless effect in most cases )-and the
impossible attempts to segregate allowable "severance"
damages from unallowable "consequential" damagesis a frightening prospect. This Court should clearly
define the distinction and set the law straight once and
for all on this matter inasmuch as it appears that the
language of the Croft case has not been sufficiently
convincing. In all of the cases tried by this writer not
one has presented legal issues and results as they developed during the trial of this action.
On the matter of sovereign immunity in eminent
domain cases, it is submitted that this case certainly
is not one where the doctrine should even be considered.
, Nevertheless, since a great number of similar cases are
reaching our courts each year, this writer earnestly
requests this Court to have another good hard look at
the doctrine, its ramifications, and its applicability in
eminent domain situations. It is again submitted that
the doctrine will not stand up to analysis, reason, and
' the applicable Constitutional provisions.
The great impact of eminent domain proceedings
in recent years clearly points the trend of the future.
It is submitted that this method of acquiring private
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property rights is probably-next to the power of tax.
ation-the greatest device whereby property rights can
be confiscated without the payment of just compensation. This erosion of private property rights is possible
because the property owner has his property taken
against his will, he is forced to pay legal fees in his
defense and must pay expensive appraisal costs in valuing his property and his damages, there is nothing
allowed to him for loss of business profits, and the available relief for moving costs and similar non-compensable
items is only partial via other laws. The property owner
has no way of being compensation for the anguish
associated with losing the one item of property which
has been most sacred since the departure of the feudal
system when the common law provided that a man could
own title to real property. Further, even in a trial
seeking just compensation, it is submitted that the
property owner, having the burden of proof as an·
nounced by our Utah Supreme Court, can really hardly
hope for compensation equal to that of the true loss
of market value.
The judgment should be reversed and the matter
remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
Glen E. Fuller
Attorney for Defendants
15 East 4th South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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